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Abstract: Measuring epistemic beliefs is challenging from a conceptual as well as a 
methodological point of view. Conceptually, it is hard to distinguish between naïve and 
sophisticated beliefs, and methodologically, common statistical techniques yield inconsistent 
results. In response to these challenges, a new instrument to measure high school students’ 
epistemic beliefs was designed and validated. The 55-item instrument contained three scales 
(absolutism, multiplism, evaluativism), that reflected different stages in epistemic 
development (Kuhn, 1991; 1999), moving from naïve to sophisticated beliefs. Rasch analysis 
was used to analyze the data. The analysis confirmed the existence of the three scales with 
moderate reliability coefficients. 
Introduction  
Epistemic beliefs, or learners’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), have received 
much attention in the learning sciences. The influence of epistemic beliefs on learning is well-documented (e.g., 
Muis, 2007; Schommer, 1990), but measurement of these beliefs is a challenge, from a conceptual as well as a 
methodological point of view. It has been argued that disappointing results should lead researchers to question 
not only the instruments they use, but also the underling theoretical frameworks as well as assumptions of 
psychometrics (Duell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001). Aim of this study was to do just that. A new measure of 
epistemic beliefs for high school students was designed and validated using a modelling technique with 
promising properties.  
Conceptual issues: Sophistication of epistemic beliefs 
An important issue in studies on epistemic beliefs concerns the level of sophistication of such beliefs. In many 
theories of personal epistemology, sophisticated learners are seen as independent and active information seekers 
who make up their minds independently from authorities. However, most judgments about knowledge claims 
are not based on personal experience, but rather on information acquired from other sources. Therefore, relying 
on experts does not necessarily reflect less sophisticated beliefs (Bromme, Kienhues, & Stahl, 2008; Elby & 
Hammer, 2001). Indeed, previous work has shown that believing in knowledge as personal construction rather 
than relying on experts may not always be an adaptive strategy in complex reading tasks, especially when 
readers lack prior knowledge (Bråten, Strømsø, & Samuelstuen, 2008). Others have argued that believing in 
scientific knowledge as tentative and evolving – which is typically considered to reflect sophistication as well – 
does not correspond to reality in some scientific domains (Elby & Hammer, 2001).  
Developmental, or stage models, of epistemic beliefs focus on the development from naïve to 
sophisticated beliefs and may therefore provide a solution to the challenges with respect to the issues of 
sophistication described above. An example is the model by Kuhn (1991), in which three stages are 
distinguished: Absolutism, multiplism, and evaluativism. People at the absolutist level see knowledge as certain 
and absolute, either transferred by experts or from direct observation. At the multiplist level, which becomes 
prevalent at adolescence (Kuhn, 1999), people become aware of the uncertain and subjective nature of 
knowledge and knowing. However, this awareness overrules any objective standards for the evaluation of 
information. As a consequence, all opinions are deemed equally valuable and right. At the evaluativist level, 
both previous stages come together. Uncertainty is acknowledged, but without ignoring the importance of 
evaluation of knowledge claims. That is, two positions can both be right, but one can be better supported by 
evidence and argumentation, making it more valuable. This makes that evaluativists are considered to have the 
most well developed epistemic beliefs (Nussbaum, Sinatra, & Poliquin, 2008).  
Methodological issues: Instruments and analysis 
These conceptual issues are directly related to measurement of epistemic beliefs. In paper-and-pencil 
instruments (e.g., Schommer, 1990) high scores on measures are interpreted to reflect sophisticated beliefs, 
regardless of stage of epistemic development. More importantly, it has been argued that research on epistemic 
beliefs is not based on a strong psychometric foundation (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold, 
2008). Validation of epistemic beliefs questionnaires is typically done with factor analysis of Likert-scale data 
(Wood & Kardash, 2002), but it has proved difficult to replicate the factor structures of widely used instruments 
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across samples (Clarebout, Elen, Luyten, & Bamps, 2001; DeBacker et al., 2008). Replication and validation 
studies have also shown large amounts of error variation and low reliability coefficients (DeBacker et al., 2008).  
 Therefore, new instruments that can distinguish between sophisticated and naïve epistemic beliefs are 
necessary. However, stage models of epistemic development are typically based on interviews (Hofer, 2004). 
Such epistemic interviews have the advantage of being capable of capturing beliefs regarding the source of 
knowledge and justification for knowing, with which existing questionnaires generally have difficulties (Hofer, 
2004). However, although such interviews can provide valuable and detailed insights into learners’ epistemic 
development, the use of paper-and-pencil instruments enables researchers to include larger numbers of 
participants in their studies and to link epistemic beliefs to learning outcomes (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). An 
existing paper-and-pencil instrument that does distinguish between absolutists, multiplists, and evaluativists was 
designed by Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000). This instrument consists of 15 items in which two 
contrasting statements are described. Participants have to answer the question whether only one could be right 
(absolutist), that both can be equally right (multiplist), or that both can be right, but one more than the other 
(evaluativist). However, this answering structure makes it difficult to assess nuances.  
Research aim 
Although others have attempted to resolve measurement problems by coming up with new or adapted 
instruments as well (see DeBacker et al., 2008), use of accurate modelling techniques is equally essential. 
Therefore, a novel approach was taken validating the instrument with a more advanced model than factor 
analysis: The Rasch model (Rasch, 1960). The Rasch model can assist in modelling invariant, test- and sample 
free, interval person and item measures. If raw ordinal person responses on sets of items composed of Likert 
scales fit the Rasch model, the model can mathematically transform the ordinal measures into interval measures 
for persons and items. The model positions persons and items on the same interval scale, making a distinction 
between items that are easy or difficult to endorse. As such, this can provide additional information on what 
epistemic beliefs make individuals more sophisticated and which ones do not. These are important advantages 
over factor analysis, making Rasch modelling a very accurate analysis method. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 509 high school students from 11th grade (257 boys; 252 girls, Mage = 16.64 years, SD = 0.68) 
from five schools for pre-university education in the South of the Netherlands.  
Instrument 
A Dutch-language questionnaire was developed based on the stages of absolutism, multiplism, and 
evaluativism. It was aimed at dealing with (conflicting) scientific claims and information, and with scientists in 
general.  Items were partly based on existing materials (Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri, & Harrison, 2004; Schommer, 
1990; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002; Wood & Kardash, 2002), either in original form or modified, but 
also featured newly developed content based on theories of epistemic development models (e.g., Kuhn, 1991), 
and a pilot study among Dutch high school students. The questionnaire consisted of 55 items, of which 19 were 
hypothesized to reflect absolutist beliefs, 19 multiplist beliefs, and 17 evaluativist beliefs. Participants rated 
their agreement or disagreement on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = completely disagree, 6 = completely agree). 
Table 1 presents a number of sample items for each scale.  
 
Table 1: Sample items per level, translated into English from Dutch 
Absolutistist Multiplistist Evaluativist 
By now, scientists know 
everything there is to know 
Personal opinions are just as 
valuable as scientific knowledge 
 
I always wonder on which 
information scientists base their 
conclusions 
 
I find it unreliable when scientists 
give contradictory information on a 
particular topic 
 
Scientists will never know 
anything for sure, no matter how 
hard they try 
You only have the right to speak 
when you know very much about a 
particular topic  
Studies that do not provide clear 
conclusions are useless 
I do not believe that something can 
be proven indisputably 
 
What is right in one situation, does 
not need to be so in another 
A single study is enough for 
scientists to get a good impression 
of a particular issue 
Scientists will never agree with one 
another 
I attach much more value to 
research data than to personal 
experiences and ideas 
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Procedure 
Participants filled in the paper-and-pencil questionnaire during regular class hours at their schools. They were 
given a full class hour to complete the questionnaire, and were explicitly requested to fill it in individually and 
honestly. Participation was made compulsory by the schools in order to avoid convenience samples. 
Analysis 
The Rasch polytomous "Grouped response-structure" model (Rasch, 1960; Linacre, 2009b) was employed to 




Conclusion and discussion 
The analysis showed that the three hypothesized dimensions of absolutism, multiplism, and evaluativism could 
be distinguished. Reliability was moderate for the three separate dimensions, and satisfactory for the entire 
epistemic beliefs scale. However, in the current study the person internal consistency measures of scales with 
only two or three categories came up to similar levels as previous instruments with more categories. Fewer 
categories always lead to lower person reliability estimates. Hence, even though internal person consistency 
measures are still modest due to category loss, the current study with the Rasch model has provided the insight 
that respondents do not distinguish more than two or three different categories in the items. Consequently, 
although person reliability coefficients are not yet sufficiently high, the use of Rasch measurement rather than 
exploratory factor analysis is a step forward with respect to measurement and construct validity. It should also 
be kept in mind that internal consistency does not necessarily imply unidimensionality, and that reliability 
estimates may also have been lowered due to the relatively homogenous sample in the present study (cf. Wood 
& Kardash, 2002). However, item reliabilities were very high, suggesting replicability of the item ordering 
across comparable samples.  
 There was a weak correlation between the multiplist and evaluativist scales, and between the absolutist 
and the evaluativist scales. This implies that the different levels may not necessarily reflect separate stages, as 
suggested by Kuhn (1999) and other stage models, but rather reflect a certain degree of multidimensionality (cf. 
Schommer, 1990). However, these findings seem to support the notion that evaluativist beliefs are theoretically 
related, in part, to the absolutist and multiplist levels.  
 Analyses of the scale structures revealed that participants did not use the whole 6-point Likert scale. In 
fact, both the absolutist and the multiplist scales provoked dichotomous response patterns, whereas the 
evaluativist scale provoked responses on a 3-point scale. This is an interesting finding, because the items were 
formulated in a pronounced way (i.e., no use of words and phases such as ‘sometimes’, ‘in most cases’, and 
‘often’) so as to prompt participants to express possible nuances in their responses. The absolutist scale was the 
most difficult to endorse, whereas the evaluativist scale was relatively easy to endorse, and might even reflect 
more socially desirable responses. In fact, compared to studies using other stage models, the high school 
students in the present study were far more evaluativist than the average college student in these other studies 
(e.g., King & Kitchener, 2002). However, previous studies were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, and cultural 
differences are likely. On the other hand, the standard deviation of the evaluative scale is fairly large, which 
might indicate that the persons are in a transition stage regarding their epistemic beliefs. As a matter of fact, 
previous work has indicated that students from senior years in secondary school increasingly hold 
predominantly evaluativist epistemic beliefs with regard to knowledge claims on social and physical truth 
(Kuhn et al., 2000). 
Implications  
The instrument described in this paper provides a first step toward accurate measures of epistemic beliefs that 
can distinguish between sophisticated and less sophisticated beliefs. Future development of the instrument will 
focus on filling the gaps items that constitute the separate dimensions. In particular, the evaluativist scale needs 
items that are more difficult to endorse, whereas the absolutist scale needs items that are easier to endorse. In its 
current form, the multiplist scale can already sufficiently distinguish between high and low multiplist students, 
and the evaluativist scale comes close. The absolutist scale requires more effort, but it can be argued that this 
may be due to the population used in this study, which is very likely beyond the absolutist stage (cf. Kuhn, 
1999). This makes it difficult for these student to endorse such items. Therefore, future work should be directed 
at studying epistemic beliefs in groups that are more heterogeneous regarding their epistemic beliefs than the 
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groups participating in the present study. In addition, the instrument will be included in empirical studies on 
information processing to investigate whether epistemic beliefs are determinants of such processing.  
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